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Utah Code Annotated Sec 35-1-77 (1)(a)

RULES
Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule

R490-1-9.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S)
Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule

R490-1-9.

SUMMARY OF REPLY
Of the points that Appellee claims were not preserved on
appeal, the first is a point of law and has no need of preservation
for appeal and the second was practically the only issue dealt with
by the Industrial Commission.
The rules command the use of a medical panel in cases of
conflicting medical reports of physical impairment. There is no
dispute that such is the case here. Therefore, the case should have
been sent to a medical panel.
The review conducted by the Industrial Commission was not a
review based on a "preponderance of the evidence standard". The
Commission itself uses the language of "substantial evidence". Such
a review is invalid and improper. The Industrial Commission is in
1
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need of guidance from this Court on the proper method of review.

REPLY ARGUMENT

The Appellee [hereinafter] Liberty Mutual has replied to the
Appellant's [hereinafter Mr. Ashcroft] brief with five points:

1.

Points 1 and 2 of Mr. Ashcroft's brief were not preserved for
appeal.

2.

A medical panel was unnecessary because Mr.Ashcroft had no
competent medical evidence to support his claim.

3.

The Industrial Commission did use the correct standard in its
review of the case.

4.

There is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Industrial Commission.

5.

Mr. Ashcroft failed to "marshall the evidence" in that he did
not list the medical evidence adverse to his case.

POINT I
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS A POINT OF LAW
NOT AN ISSUE TO BE PRESERVED FOR REVIEW
Liberty Mutual seems to be confused over the meaning of point
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I of the Mr. Ashcroft's brief. The point reads:
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER.
This point is not an issue to be decided but is a point of law
which is supported by several cases. While it may be true that this
argument was not used at the Commission level, there is no rule or
law

that would

prevent

the utilization

of

these

cases

and

principles at a later date in an appellate proceeding.
Point 2 of Mr. Ashcroftfs brief reads:
THE CONTINUING MEDICAL PROBLEMS CLEARLY AROSE OUT OF THE
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND NOT OUT OF SUBSEQUENT
"EPISODES".
This is simply a statement that the Commission was incorrect
in its medical factual conclusions. To argue that this issue was
not present in the appeal to the Commission is amazing. The
Commission delineated the issues that it was dealing with in its
denial of motion for review:
1. Rejection of the ALJ of two permanent partial
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done
by the "Liberty Mutual account manager."
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel be
convened to consider among other things the question of
maximum medical improvement.
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors were in
the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not
decided on a course of treatment.
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor1 s results that the
applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment.
5. This case contains objective evidence of several
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a
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clear possibility but for the complication of the AIDS.
See DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REVIEW page 1.
Four of these five arguments were designed to convince the
Commission that their findings of fact were incorrect. Specifically
if the Commission had agreed with Mr. Ashcroft that there was
evidence of disc injury
POINT II
THE RULE REQUIRES CONTROVERSIES OF THIS TYPE TO BE SUBMITTED
TO A MEDICAL REVIEW BOARD
Liberty Mutual claims that the rating of Doctors Sanders and
McNaught "do not remotely qualify as medically and empirically
substantiated

impairment

ratings". Since these

ratings don't

qualify, Liberty Mutual claims that the judge was justified in not
submitting these ratings to a medical panel. This is simply not the
rule. This decision is not in the hands of the administrative
judge.
The rule is quite specific:
A panel will be utilized by the administrative law judge
where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved.
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by
conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are
involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of physical impairment
which vary more than 5% of the whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary
total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more
than $2,000.
*
See Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule R490-1-9.
There is no leeway given to the judge as to whether or not he
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believes the medical report or whether he believes the level of
impairment is justified by the facts. The judge is not a doctor.
The rules clearly states that such a controversy over levels of
impairment are to be settled by doctors on a medical panel.
Liberty Mutual contends that the statute granting the use of
a medical panel is permissive and indeed it is:
"... the Commission may refer the medical aspects of the
case to a medical panel appointed by the commission11
See U.C.A. Sec 35-1-77 (1)(a)
While the grant to the commission itself is permissive the
rules promulgated by the commission to its administrative law
v

judges is not permissive:

"A panel will be utilized by the administrative law judge
where:"
See Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule R490-1-9. The
administrative law judge has no leeway even if the Commission
itself did have leeway in the promulgation of the rule. Even if
there were no statutory grant at all in the use of medical the
Commission could make it mandatory for their judges to use such
panels.
If the rule is considered permissive for the judges then the
rule simply has no meaning at all. Judges may decide to use the
medical panel or not under whatever circumstances they please.
Obviously, there would be no uniformity and predictability to such
a system.
In actual practice this rule serves a very important purpose.
5
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Insurance companies are aware of which doctors will give them the
ratings that they want. Those doctors find considerable business
with the insurance companies and have a personal interest in
assuring continued employment. One way to counteract such personal
interest is to create a panel that will review conflicting ratings.
The Industrial Commission wisely decided to make such panels
mandatory under certain conditions.
Liberty Mutual also contends that a medical panel is not
necessary because the rules which control the medical panel are
"guidelines" and therefore they can be followed by the judges and
the commission when they are so inclined and that they may decline
to

follow

these

"guidelines" when

contrarily

inclined.

This

conclusion appears to be based on the fact that the heading of Rule
R490-1-9 reads "Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel".
There are three reasons why such a conclusion is inaccurate.
The first is that the heading of a rule is not determinative of its
content. The body of the rule itself is the explanation of the
meaning of the heading. A Subchapter S Corporation gains its
meaning not from its heading but from the body of the information
which defines such a corporation. Hence the "guidelines" explained
in the rule are made permissive or mandatory based on the rule
which follows. The guideline for submission of the case to a
medical panel based on certain criteria is made mandatory if the
conditions of the rule are met. It is undisputed that these
conditions are met in this case. Therefore the submission of the
case to a medical panel is mandatory.
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Secondly, the established rule of statutory interpretation is
that the specific controls over the general. In this case even if
there were a general grant of permissiveness in the heading, there
is a specific mandatory command in the body of the rule. Since the
specific controls over the general, the mandatory command is the
controlling interpretation.
Finally, the word

guideline

does not necessarily

imply

permissiveness. My thesaurus states that synonyms for guideline
are: direction, instruction, regulation, rule or stricture. None
of these words, used in a regulatory sense, imply permissiveness.
The mere fact that word "guideline" is used in the heading of
the Rules does not change the clear meaning of the rule. A medical
panel "will" be used when a specific set of circumstances is met.
It is uncontested that these circumstances were met. A panel was
not used. Herein, we have clear error.

POINT III
THE REVIEW DONE BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MUST BE CORRECT
IN FACT AND IN FORM

Petitioner acknowledges the fact that the Commissioners do not
necessarily have legal training and so may be inexpert in their use
of legal language. But, the commission executes a judicial function
which is of critical importance to many injured workers. The
standard of review which the commission uses is critical with
respect to the adjudication of cases at the administrative judge
level. We

are

certain

that

this Court

recognizes
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that

the

Commission is reviewing the actions of its own administrative
judges. It is imperative that this review not give way to
bureaucratic efficiency, but that this review is calculated to
insure that substantial justice is done in these cases. Therefore,
we would ask this Court to instruct the Commission that the
appropriate standard of review must applied at the Commission level
in form and in fact. In applying the "preponderance of the evidence
rule" the Commission must explore the evidence which is available
on both sides of the issue and explain why one body of evidence is
superior to the other.
If such instruction is not given to the Commission we can
anticipate, at the least, continued

loose language

from the

Commission in their decisions. What is more likely is that the
Commission will simply use the rule which they have declared that
they are using, which is a "substantial evidence" standard. Such
a rule would allow the Commission to seek out any evidence that
would support its judges and therefore reinforce the power of the
Commission's judges and ease its own administrative burdens.
If the Commission uses the language of substantial evidence,
it must be assumed that the Commission is using the substantial
evidence review. If the Commission is allowed to use the language
of substantial evidence then we are more likely to see appeals of
such rulings with the burden falling on this court to review each
ruling to decide whether the Commission actually meant what they
said.
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POINT IV
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT MEET THE
STANDARD OF A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
Again Liberty Mutual has missed the point and shares the
confusion of the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission's
review was based on a substantial evidence standard. As we have
shown, the proper review standard is a "preponderance of the
evidence". To

recite

the

case against Mr. Ashcroft without

specifically weighing all of the evidence for Mr. Ashcroft is an
invalid analysis.
A "preponderance of the evidence" review requires that the
both sides of the argument be weighed and considered. This was not
done by the Industrial Commission in their review. To simply state
that there is evidence to support the decision is exactly the error
created by the Industrial Commission initially.
POINT V
MR. ASHCROFT HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE EQUALLY AS WELL
AS EITHER LIBERTY MUTUAL OR THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
It is somewhat poetic that Liberty Mutual should now accuse
Mr. Ashcroft of the same sin of which the Industrial Commission is
guilty. While Liberty Mutual finds no problem with a marshalling
of the evidence satisfying a simple "substantial evidence" standard
by either the Industrial Commission or itself, they take issue with
Mr. Ashcroft's emphasis on his own best evidence. While it could
be argued, the question raised is basically one of fact to be
decided by a perusal of the evidence available in the record and
on the briefs.
9
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The appellant is content to leave the question to this court
to decide if the record and briefs provide sufficient information
for a determination of the issue.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

The decision of the Industrial Commission should be overturned
and sent back with intructions that a medical panel be used and
that reviews by the Industrial Commmissions of lower judges must
be done based on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard with
appropriate language and weighing of the evidence from both sides.

Sam Primavera, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant

(
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